
Tales from the SOC: Social engineering – What to do? | S1 Ep015
What if your attackers don’t need any technical skills? What if you let them in yourself, simply by being too helpful?


In response to increasing measures taken by email service providers to block phishing and spam emails, hackers have resorted to a new tactic: injecting phishing content into legitimate email notifications from trusted providers.
The method is highly sophisticated, and it’s happening at scale. A study by KnowBe4 shows that 22% of all phishing attacks go through a legitimate platform.
The umbrella term for attacks that abuse trust from a legitimate platform is Living Off Trusted Services (LOTS), of which email forwarding is just a small part.
The attack’s popularity lies in the fact that emails sent from legitimate services pass all authenticity checks, specifically SPF, DKIM, and DMARC. (We’ll define these in detail in a second.)
Together, these three industry standards prevent attackers from spoofing addresses. Before they existed, it was impossible for SMTP to prove who sent a message. Technically, SMTP still can’t do this. You can put any “from” address in an email, and SMTP will forward it. What SPF, DKIM, and DMARC do is give email service providers the ability to verify that the sender is legitimate.
SPF (Sender Policy Framework) is a DNS record that lists which servers are allowed to send email for a domain. The receiving server can then check whether a message’s sending IP is on that list.
DKIM (DomainKeys Identified Mail) is a cryptographic signature added to the message by the sending domain. The receiving server can verify the signature to ensure the email did indeed originate from the “from” address.
Finally, DMARC (Domain-based Message Authentication, Reporting and Conformance) is a policy configured on the sending domain that tells receiving servers what to do with messages that fail SPF/DKIM checks. It also includes a receiving address so the domain owner can receive abuse reports.
With these three policies in place, gone were the days of placing any desired “from” domain in message envelopes. By using legitimate notification emails as carriers for spam messages, hackers get around these checks because they all pass.
Using this tactic means that the phishing emails are legitimately coming from the domain owner’s infrastructure.
The attacks work in two ways:
These are best described in examples.
All notification emails contain template fields, such as a field for the person’s first name.
In a recent phishing attempt, an attacker used the first name “Suspicious Account Access, Not You” and the last name “Call us now [PHONE NUMBER]” in an eBay account. The attacker then added a potential victim’s email address as a backup for alert notifications, followed by changing their own password. The password change triggered an eBay alert email which read: “Hi Suspicious Account Access, Not You? Call us now [PHONE NUMBER].”
The rest of the email contained eBay’s usual password-change email text. The attacker was hoping a victim would pick up the phone and call the attacker’s number.
(As a side note, eBay’s user-input sanitization here is dismal, allowing question marks, numbers, and commas in a name field.)
Attackers can replace links in two ways:
It’s rare that users can type clickable links into a notification box, but this isn’t always necessary. For example, Gmail automatically converts text links into clickable links, allowing attackers to paste plain-text links and then let Gmail do the work for them.
The second method is more sophisticated and occurred in another phishing attempt, also described on LinkedIn. This attack is immensely intricate, so we’ll describe it separately.
The LinkedIn post didn’t quite get the facts about this hack entirely correct (it’s tremendously sophisticated), but one of the commenters on the post spotted something the poster didn’t: The attacker leveraged a little-known feature in Google Workspace that allowed them to insert a malicious redirect as a link.
The feature relates to Google’s integration of SAML (Security Assertion Markup Language) into Google Workspace.
SAML is a protocol that lets different systems share authentication information so that users don’t need to log in twice. Google Workspace allows administrators to specify an “inbound SAML SSO profile.” When users sign in on the “inbound profile” (e.g., a company portal), the profile shares the successful authentication with Google, preventing the user from having to log in again.
When a Google Workspace admin configures SAML on their account, Google appends a “samlredirect” URL to the Google login, which then redirects the user to the external identity provider.
In this particular hack, the hacker configured SAML to point to a phishing site that looked exactly like a Google login page. They even used Google sites, thus keeping the victim on Google.
Looking at the above, the sequence seems so easy to abuse, and it is, but only now that we know the mechanism. This hack was also accompanied by highly sophisticated template field replacements that we haven’t yet figured out how they work.
Finally, the hacker actually granted the victim access to the hacker’s email account through delegation, thus triggering the email alert.
The use of a Google Sites domain can also trigger a password manager to automatically fill in a password, a technique reported previously in a different phishing attempt.
DocuSign and QuickBooks accounted for almost two-thirds of this type of campaign in the KnowBe4 study. However, the QuickBooks campaign had a sudden surge then dropped again, whereas DocuSign sees more regular abuse.
Document Signing services are heavily abused because people trust them so much. Attackers abuse free-tier registration emails to insert lures that lead to buttons with text such as “Sign Now” or “Review Document,” which then go to a run-of-the-mill phishing site that impersonates Google or Microsoft.
Another popular document-signing service for abuse is Adobe.
Google Drive is the third-most abused platform, and the mechanism is surprisingly simple: Attackers share a Google Doc with the victim, then add a comment to the doc with an “@” mention. The victim receives an email replete with a malicious link inside, and it all looks legit. Attackers can further bolster this by using links from trusted services that forward to a malicious site so that the links don’t get flagged by an email filtering program.
Similarly, hackers use Microsoft SharePoint shared file notifications to insert malicious links that lead away from Microsoft-owned sites to malicious sites.
Other popular services for these kinds of emails include Dropbox, SurveyMonkey, WeTransfer, and Notion.
AI has changed how attackers write phishing emails. It hasn’t changed what stops them. Security professionals broadly agree that the best defense against today’s flood of attacks is still the basics, done well and done consistently.
For phishing sent from legitimate email providers, that comes down to:
None of this is new, and that’s the point. We don’t need to reinvent the wheel. We just need to make sure it’s actually turning.
To learn more about SolCyber’s offerings, reach out to us for a no-obligation chat.
Photo by stephen momot on Unsplash

What if your attackers don’t need any technical skills? What if you let them in yourself, simply by being too helpful?

Learn about AD attacks and how hackers are getting access into your network.

When cybercriminals are around, what you see at the outset is rarely what you get in the end.

By subscribing you agree to our Privacy Policy and provide consent to receive updates from our company.






